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COMMENT
DEFECTIVE DESIGN - WISCONSIN'S
LIMITATION OF ACTION STATUTE FOR
ARCHITECTS, CONTRACTORS AND OTHERS
INVOLVED IN DESIGN AND IMPROVEMENT
TO REAL PROPERTY
Largely because of strong lobbying efforts by contractors
and architects,' over forty states,2 including Wisconsin, have
enacted special statutes of limitation designed to bar claims
against those who perform or furnish the design, planning, su-
pervision or construction of improvements to real property.
Under these statutes the period of limitation commences with
the completion of an improvement to real property.3 Although
"completion" statutes were designed to alleviate problems be-
lieved to be endemic to architects and contractors, it now ap-
pears that they may overstep constitutional guarantees in a
number of respects. Indeed, Wisconsin's first completion stat-
ute was found to be a denial of equal protection soon after its
enactment.4 Although the Wisconsin Legislature has amended
and reenacted the original completion statute, 5 it appears
likely this statute will also meet with constitutional
invalidation.'
1. See Comment, Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and Build-
ers-Blueprints for Non-action, 18 CATH. U.L. RaV. 361 (1968-69) [hereinafter cited as
Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and Builders].
2. J. SwEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHrrECTURE, ENGINEERING, AND THE CONSTRUCTION
PROCESS 734 (2d ed. 1977). Knapp, Application of Special Statutes of Limitations
Concerning Design and Construction, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 351 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Statutes of Limitations Concerning Design and Construction].
3. Wis. STAT. § 893.155 (1977).
4. Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1974).
Similar statutes in seven other jurisdictions have also been invalidated. Alabama,
Plant v. R.L. Reid, Inc., 294 Ala. 155, 313 So. 2d 518 (1975); Hawaii, Fujioka v. Kam,
55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973); Illinois, Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231
N.E.2d 588 (1967); Kentucky, Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973); Minnesota,
Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thomas-Yeager Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1978); Oklahoma,
Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977); South
Carolina, Broome v. Trulucki, 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978). (Michigan's court
of appeals found their statute unconstitutional and the case is presently pending
before the state supreme court. Muzar v. Metro Town Houses, Inc., 82 Mich. App.
368, 266 N.W.2d 850 (1978)).
5. Wis. STAT. § 893.155 (1977).
6. But see Statutes of Limitations Concerning Design and Construction, supra
note 2, at 364, stating that the new completion statute cured its predecessor's defects.
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The purpose of this comment is to trace Wisconsin's expe-
rience with its completion statute, delineate the policy consid-
erations favoring and opposing such a statute and determine
whether the state's new completion statute will withstand con-
stitutional challenges. In addition, this comment will examine
the law as it existed subsequent to the invalidation of Wiscon-
sin's first completion statute but before the adoption of the
state's second completion statute. This inquiry is crucial be-
cause cases decided during this interim period may once again
become controlling law if the current statute is also found to
be unconstitutional. Finally, this comment will propose a stat-
ute which, it is asserted, will withstand equal protection and
due process assaults while contemporaneously providing for
the special needs of those who furnish or design improvements
to real property.
I. AccRuAL OR COMPLETION?
Prior to the enactment of Wisconsin's first completion stat-
ute, injuries to property were governed by a six-year limitation
period which ran from the accrual of an action.7 A cause of
action accrues when there "exists a claim capable of present
enforcement, a suable party against whom it may be enforced,
and a party who has a present right to enforce it."" For a neg-
ligence action to accrue there must be a negligent act or omis-
sion, causation and injury.9 Although accrual statutes are a
common and seemingly Workable system of limitations, they
are readily susceptible to criticism.
The primary difficulty with an accrual statute is that a
builder or architect can be subjected to liability many years
after the completion of construction. This "long-tail" problem
arises because the period of limitations under an accrual stat-
ute does not begin to run until there has been an injury to
property. An injury exists if it is "sufficiently significant" to
put a plaintiff on notice. This definition of an injury poses a
formidable problem of proof for defendants.
7. Wis. STAT. § 330.19(5) (1961). In Wisconsin, a statute of limitations is not
merely a statute of repose, but one which creates and extinguishes rights. Maryland
Cas. Co. v. Beleznay, 245 Wis. 390, 393, 14 N.W.2d 177, 179 (1944).
8. Holifield v. Setco Indus., Inc., 42 Wis. 2d 750, 754, 168 N.W.2d 177, 179 (1968).
9. Peterson v. Roloff, 57 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 203 N.W.2d 699, 703 (1972).
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The "long-tail" and notice of injury problems are aptly il-
lustrated by the facts in Abramowski v. Wm. Kilps Sons Re-
alty, Inc.,"0 Which involved an action against a builder who
had constructed a home for plaintiffs' predecessors in title.
The defendant had completed construction in 1962. In 1974,
three years after plaintiffs had purchased the home, the foun-
dation caved in. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that no
action had accrued until 1974, the year in which the injury to
property had occurred.
As the above facts demonstrate, a defendant under an ac-
crual statute can be subjected to liability after an indefinite
period of time. Although the builder in Abramowski had com-
pleted construction in 1962, the foundation did not cave in un-
til 1974 - twelve years after completion of construction. The
original owners had sold the home four years earlier and it was
the subsequent owners who brought suit." The original owners
may have had relevant evidence, but their presence could not
be secured for trial. The other concern, the difficulty in deter-
mining when plaintiffs have sufficient notice of their injury to
bring a claim, is the other side of the coin of the "long-tail"
problem. The claim in Abramowski had not been brought un-
til the foundation had caved in. Had there been water in the
basement before this? Were there cracks in the walls or base-
ment floor? Had plaintiffs' predecessors in title known of the
defect? Under an accrual statute it would be difficult, if not
nearly impossible, for a defendant to ascertain facts relevant
to these crucial inquiries.
Perhaps in an attempt to eliminate the "long-tail" and no-
tice of injury problems, the Wisconsin Legislature adopted the
state's first completion statute.12 This statute defined two dis-
10. 80 Wis. 2d 468, 239 N.W.2d 306 (1977).
11. Wisconsin, like many jurisdictions, now recognizes that a third party need not
have privity to bring suit in such cases. See, e.g., A.E. Investment Corp. v. Link
Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 214 N.W.2d 764 (1973) (architects); Fisher v. Simon, 15
Wis. 2d 207, 112 N.W.2d 705 (1961) (builders). See also RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF
ToRTs § 385 (1965).
12. Wisconsin's first completion statute was adopted in the following form:
893.155 Within 6 years. No action to recover damages for any injury to prop-
erty, or for an injury to the person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, aris-
ing out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real prop-
erty, nor any action for contribution or indemnity for damages sustained on
account of such injury, shall be brought against any person performing or fur-
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tinct times from which the bringing of an action was to be
measured. As to persons involved in the design, planning or
supervision of construction, the period ran from the time of
completion. As to persons in control of the premises, such as
owners, the statute did not apply and the time period did not
run from the time of completion but from the time the cause
of action accrued.' 3
In addition to the elimination of the "long-tail" and notice
of injury problems, a number of policy considerations have
been advanced in favor of a special statute of limitations for
builders and architects. First, it has been urged that eviden-
tiary difficulties demand that special protection be accorded
nishing the design, planning, supervision of construction or construction of
such improvement to real property, more than 6 years after the performance or
furnishing of such services and construction. This limitation shall not apply to
any person in actual possession and control as owner, tenant or otherwise, of
the improvement at the time the defective and unsafe condition of such im-
provement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury for which it is pro-
posed to bring an action.
Wi. STAT. § 893.155 (1971).
The history behind the adoption of completion statutes is discussed in Limitation
of Action Statutes for Architects and Builders, supra note 1, at 361.
13. The operation of this statute is illustrated by the facts in Cohen v. Towne
Realty, 54 Wis. 2d 1, 194 N.W.2d 298 (1971), which involved an action by tenants
against the owner-manager of an apartment building in which plaintiffs had suffered
an injury in a fire. Five months after the plaintiffs filed their original action, the
defendants filed a third-party complaint against the architect alleging negligent de-
sign and supervision. By the time the defendant had filed the third-party complaint,
however, more than six years had passed since the completion of the architectural
services, although had the plaintiffs originally joined the architects, or had the defen-
dant acted sooner, the time would not have expired. Assuming, arguendo, that the
architects in Cohen had actually been responsible for the defective design, the com-
pletion statute permitted the Cohens, as tenants, to bring suit against the owner since
the completion statute excepted such defendants. Even if plaintiffs had delayed
another five months as did the owners, their suit would not have been barred. How-
ever, when the defendant-owner attempted to join the party responsibile for plaintiff's
injury, he was barred by the completion statute.
As the above example suggests, the distinction between patent and latent defects is
crucial under a completion statute. Patent defects are those which are apparent by
reasonable inspection. Under an accrual statute, it was unnecessary to distinguish
between patent and latent defects since the limitations period did not begin to run
until there was an injury. However, when the legislature adopted a completion statute
without distinguishing patent and latent defects, there were at times harsh conse-
quences. As to patent defects, the completion statute merely defined the time for
bringing claims; but as to latent defects that were not apparent until the time defined
by the statute had run, the right to bring suit was cut off before an action had even
accrued. It is this latter effect to which the courts have objected.
[Vol. 63:87
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architects and builders. In Howell v. Burk," the New Mexico
Supreme Court, while admitting that a completion statute
treats classes differently, claimed that the justification for this
was that "there is a difference in the problems of defending
such claims. Architectural plans may have been discarded
[and] copies of building codes in force at the time of construc-
tion may no longer be in existence . "..."15 Moreover, mainte-
nance over the years may cause stress and strain to an im-
provement. A builder's or architect's lack of knowledge or
control over such upkeep can only exacerbate the problems of
proof with which he is already faced.
A second, closely related reason advanced for these special
statutes is the lack of access and control by defendants.16 As it
is the landowner or tenant who is in control, and thus in a
position to prevent deterioration, policy should favor shifting
the burden of compensating injuries to these individuals. Fur-
ther, an "owner or tenant may permit unsafe conditions to de-
velop, or use the premises for a purpose for which it was not
designed, or make defective alternations which may appear to
be a part of the original construction." 17
A third justification derives from the time factor involved.
Because latent defects can go undetected f'or long periods, pol-
icy demands a point in time at which defendants should no
longer be concerned with liability. Closely related to this con-
sideration is the "desire to relieve [courts] of the burden of
adjudicating inconsequential or tenuous claims." 8
Economic factors must also be considered. The legislature,
determining one industry better able to shoulder the burden
than another, may decide to shift the economic loss to land-
owners rather than architects or contractors. Since landowners
may procure insurance, arguably they can protect their inter-
ests more readily than members of the favored class.
14. 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214 (1977).
15. Id. at -, 568 P.2d at 520. The New Mexico completion statute is N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 23-1-26 (1953).
16. See Statutes of Limitations Concerning Design and Construction, supra note
2, at 355.
17. 90 N.M. at -, 568 P.2d at 220.
18. Note, Development in the Law - Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REv.
1177, 1185 (1949-50) (citations and footnotes omitted). See also id. at 1204 wherein




In contrast to the policy reasons supporting the completion
statute, parallel considerations exist which seem to demand
that the favored class be given no special treatment. While
special treatment has been justified on the basis of evidentiary
problems, landowners and others in control may be similarly
disadvantaged. In fact, because these defendants may not
have had possession of or access to architectural plans, they
may be additionally disadvantaged.
The argument that builders and architects might be disad-
vantaged by an owner's alterations to the property confuses
the distinction between actions based on strict liability and
negligence actions. Once a builder or architect has completed
work, the owner or other person making unsafe alterations is
solely responsible for the work he has done. The builder or ar-
chitect is subject to liability only with respect to his original
performance. While subsequent alterations may obfuscate the
issue of causation, this appears to be an insufficient basis for
absolving the more responsible party from all liability.
While it may be desirable to establish a point after which a
builder or architect will no longer be liable, the "long-tail"
problem is not nearly as nefarious as it is made out to be. The
passage of time will likely increase evidentiary difficulties for
plaintiffs and defendants alike. Moreover, the evidentiary
problem may well be more acute for plaintiffs, who must, after
all, establish fault on the part of a defendant. Thus, the mere
passage of time is not likely to disadvantage a defendant any
more than it does a plaintiff.
Completion statutes have also been justified as a legisla-
tive attempt to ease the burden on the judiciary. While unbur-
dening courts is a legitimate legislative goal, the completion
statute fails to accomplish this end. An injured tenant, for ex-
ample, could initiate a suit against his landlord; the comple-
tion statute would not bar the suit, but it might bar the land-
lord from getting indemnification if the tenant's injury
resulted from the negligence of a member of the protected
class. 9 Thus, while a court action progresses, the statute
works only to bar the trier of fact from completely attributing
fault to the responsible party. Additionally, a completion stat-
19. See, e.g., Cohen v. Towne Realty, 54 Wis. 2d 1, 194 N.W.2d 298 (1971).
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ute is not necessary to protect builders and architects from
unfounded claims. In Wisconsin, a party who initiates a frivo-
lous suit can be subjected to liability for attorney's fees and
costs."0 With this kind of protection from frivolous claims, it
would seem reasonable that parties should not fear that they
will be called on to defend claims which lack a real foundation
for potential liability.
Finally, economic considerations, when examined within
the context of the statute, do not always result in transferring
a burden to one better able to shoulder the cost. In one case,
the owner may be a large real estate developer, while in an-
other, the owner may be an individual owning but a single
property; or, in another example, the statute would not differ-
entiate a large supermarket chain from a local "mom and
pop" grocery store. While some defendants could well afford to
absorb the shifted burden, others will undoubtedly be unable
to do so. Another economic factor concerns the ability of land-
owners to protect themselves with insurance. However, archi-
tects and builders may also protect themselves. The cost of
their insurance, moreover, would be passed on to those who
benefit from their services. By requiring this class to continue
to shoulder these costs, the burden is placed on the enterprise
which is in the best position to prevent such losses initially. It
can even be argued that a completion statute which wipes
aside all liability after a stated number of years from the date
of performance discourages rather than encourages prevent-
ative design and care. One commentator has further argued
that the law should seek to compensate victims rather than to
protect enterprises.' This is a particularly telling argument in
light of the manner in which the earliest completion statutes
were enacted. Since architects were represented by lobbying
groups,22 it would behoove the legislature to closely examine
any policy statement favoring this class.
20. Wis. STAT. § 814.025 (1977). See e.g., Wisconsin v. Johnson, No. 32572 (Cir.
Ct., La Crosse, 1979) ($6000 fine awarded).
21. J. SwEEr, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION
PROCESS, at 824 (2d ed. 1977).





In light of the foregoing considerations, it is not surprising
that Wisconsin's first completion statute was soon challenged
on constitutional grounds. The difficulty with the statute, of
course, was its protection of a specific class of defendants ex-
cluding owners and tenants. After sidestepping the issue in
two early cases,2 the Wisconsin Supreme Court finally ad-
dressed the statute's constitutional infirmities in Kallas
Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co. 4
Kallas Millwork had occupied property adjacent to defen-
dant, Square D. Sometime between 1945 and 1952, I.T.T.
Grinnell Corporation installed a high-pressure waterline on
Square D property. In 1968, the waterline ruptured causing
substantial damage to plaintiff's adjacent property. Kallas
brought suit against Square D and Grinnell alleging negligent
installation of the water system. Grinnell demurred on the ba-
sis that the limitation period had run under the completion
statute. The trial court overruled the demurrer on the ground
that there was an issue as to whether a fire protection system
was an improvement to real property under section 893.155,
the state's completion statute. On appeal, the supreme court
found that a fire protection system was an improvement as a
matter of law; as a result, section 893.155 would supposedly
bar the claim. Once again an owner of property would have
been subject to suit without ability to obtain indemnification
from the party primarily responsible for the defect; the court,
however, did not permit such a result. Instead, it found "that
there is little rational justification for this statute [since] the
effect here is to give special and unusual immunities to the
class referred to in the statute as persons 'performing or fur-
nishing the design, planning, supervision of construction or
construction of such improvement to real property.' "2
The court in Kallas listed several reasons for declaring the
completion statute unconstitutional. First, the statute unrea-
sonably granted immunity to a special class of defendants
thereby denying other defendants equal protection of the laws.
23. See Cohen v. Towne Realty, 54 Wis. 2d 1, 194 N.W.2d 298 (1971) and Rosen-
thal v. Kurtz, 62 Wis. 2d 1, 213 N.W.2d 741 (1974).
24. 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975).
25. Id. at 388, 225 N.W.2d at 458.
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Second, the court found that the statute may deprive a plain-
tiff of a remedy for a wrong under article I, section 9 of the
state constitution. Since both of these grounds, equal protec-
tion and a remedy for a wrong, may have an impact on Wis-
consin's new completion statute, it is necessary to state in
some detail not only the Wisconsin Supreme Court's reasoning
as to each basis but that of courts in other jurisdictions as
well.
A. Equal Protection
In Kallas, the court stated a two-part test for finding legis-
lation invalid under the equal protection clause. First, it must
be determined whether the statute singles out a group to be
protected while excluding others.26 As has been demonstrated,
Wisconsin's first completion statute clearly had this effect.
Second, "only if the classification is arbitrary and has no rea-
sonable purpose or reflects no justifiable public policy will the
classification be held violative of constitutional guarantees of
equal protection."27 The court, reiterating many of the policy
arguments mentioned earlier, found no substantial distinc-
tions that made the protected class different from the class
not so protected."
26. Id.
27. Id. The Kallas court cited Dane County v. McManus, 55 Wis. 2d 413, 198
N.W.2d 667 (1972), which listed five criteria which a classification must satisfy:
(1) All classifications must be based upon substantial distinctions which
make one class really different from another.
(2) The classification adopted must be germane to the purpose of the law.
(3) The classification must not be based upon existing circumstances only
... .It must not be so constituted as to preclude addition to the numbers
included within a class.
(4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply equally to each member
thereof.
(5) That the characteristics of each class should be so far different from those
of other classes as to reasonably suggest at least the propriety, having regard to
the public good, of substantially different legislation.
55 Wis. 2d 413, 423, 198 N.W.2d 667, 672-73 (1972). See also State ex reL. Baer v. City
of Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 624, 148 N.W.2d 21 (1967); State ex rel. Ford Hopkins Co.
v. Mayor of Watertown, 226 Wis. 215, 276 N.W. 311 (1937).
28. In Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973), the Hawaii Supreme
Court succintly stated the rationale for invalidating a completion statute on equal
protection grounds:
The statute on one hand grants immunity to the engineer and the contractor,
who should and would be, but for the statute, primarily responsible . . . . On




the necessity of declaring section 893.155 unconstitutional,
noted that the Illinois completion statute" had been held un-
constitutional as special legislation prohibited by the Illinois
Constitution.37 The court pointed out that the Wisconsin stat-
ute might be similarly infirm under article I, section 9 of the
Wisconsin Constitution.38
The Rosenthal court suggested that the reason for an arti-
cle I, section 9 attack is a conflict between the reading of sec-
tion 893.14, the prefatory section for the limitations statutes
which provides that in each of the limitations specified a right
of action exists, and section 893.155, which states that no ac-
tion may be brought more than six years after substantial
completion of construction. Since section 893.14 is a legisla-
tively recognized right, the completion statute may bar a
legislature if we did not point out the extremely shaky constitutional and statutorily
anomalous underpinnings of the statute." 62 Wis. 2d at 11, 213 N.W.2d at 746. Con-
tra, Josephs v. Burns, 260 Or. 493, 491 P.2d 203 (1971), wherein the court found the
completion statute not to be in contravention of the Oregon Constitution, article I,
section 10, which provides that "[e]very man shall have remedy by due course of law
for injury done him in his person, property or reputation."
35. 62 Wis. 2d 1, 213 N.W.2d 741 (1974).
36. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 24f (Smith-Hurd 1966) (repealed 1969).
37. Skinner v. Anderson, 38 ll. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967). In declaring the
statute constitutional, the court stated:
[T]he statute singles out the architect and the contractor and grants them im-
munity. It is not at all inconceivable that the owner or person in control of such
an improvement might be held liable for damage or injury that results from a
defective condition for which the architect or contractor is in fact responsible.
Not only is the owner or person in control given no immunity; the statute takes
away his action for indemnity against the architect or contractor.
The arbitrary quality of the statute clearly appears when we consider that
architects and contractors are not the only persons whose negligence in the con-
struction of a building or other improvement may cause damage to property or
injury to persons. If, for example, four years [the Illinois time period] after a
building is completed a cornice should fall because the adhesive used was de-
fective, the manufacturer of the adhesive is granted no immunity. And so it is
with all others who furnish materials used in constructing the improvement.
But if the cornice fell because of defective design or construction for which an
architect or contractor was responsible, immunity is granted.
Id. at 460, 231 N.E.2d at 591.
38. Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or
wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character; he ought to
obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and
without denial, promptly and without delay, conformable to the laws.
WIs. CONSr. art. I, § 9.
19791
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claim before a cause of action has accrued under section
893.14.31
At the outset of the opinion in Kallas the court stated that
"the statute [section 893.155] deprives a plaintiff of a remedy
for a wrong that is recognized by the laws of the state. The
statute is therefore .. .unconstitutional under art. I, sec. 9,
of the Wisconsin Constitution."" However, once the court
found an equal protection violation, no further discussion of a
remedy for a wrong was provided. In fact, the court seemed to
retreat from the forthright statement made initially when it
stated: "While we find arguable merit in the argument we
posed in Rosenthal, i.e., that sec. 895.155 . ..denies a rem-
edy for a legislatively recognized right under art. I, sec. 9, of
the Wisconsin Constitution, we do not rest our decision on
that aspect of possible unconstitutionality."' Because of this,
the Rosenthal dictum remains the best indication of possible
infirmities of the completion statute on this state constitu-
tional ground.
The court in Kallas did, however, cite a 1902 case, Diana
Shooting Club v. Lamoreux,42 as another source of authority
for attacking the completion statute on these constitutional
grounds. Diana Shooting Club involved an action to recover
damages from a hunter who had trespassed upon the plain-
tiff's property. Addressing the issue of whether an action in-
volving only nominal damages could be maintained, the court
concluded that the constitution guaranteed a remedy for every
wrong, stating that "[e]very person has a constitutional right
to the exclusive enjoyment of his own property for any purpose
which does not invade the rights of another person. '4 3
39. This inequity can be illustrated by the facts in Kailas, where the plaintiffs,
adjacent property owners to Square D, suffered injury when the defendant's high pres-
sure water system ruptured. Prior to this rupture and water damage, the plaintiffs
had no cause of action. In fact, as to Grinnell, the installer of the water line, plaintiffs
could not have brought suit before their injury even if they knew of a defect in design
since it was the defendant's property. Once the plaintiff had suffered an injury and
brought suit against Grinnell, section 893.155 became operative and barred the suit
even though under section 893.14 the cause of action did not accrue until the rupture.
Since section 893.155 operated to bar the claim, plaintiffs would have suffered a
wrong without a remedy.
40. 66 Wis. 2d at 384, 225 N.W.2d at 455-56.
41. Id. at 393, 225 N.W.2d at 460 (footnote omitted).
42. 114 Wis. 44, 89 N.W. 880 (1902) (cited in Kallas at 66 Wis. 2d at 393, 225
N.W.2d at 460).
43. 114 Wis. at 59, 89 N.W. at 886.
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The Diana Shooting Club case may have important impli-
cations. First, the case dealt with the common-law action of
trespass. Second, the opinion stated that article I, section 9
guaranteed a remedy for this common-law right. Finally, it
should be remembered that the water damage suffered in Kal-
las constituted a trespass by the adjacent property owner.
Thus, the court in Kallas may well be suggesting that the
completion statute is void not only because it denies a legisla-
tively recognized right but also because it denies a right recog-
nized at common law.
A case which directly confronts the issue of whether the
legislature may act in creating a limitations statute in derro-
gation of a claim recognized at common law is Saylor v. Hall."
This case may also illustrate why the Wisconsin court was un-
willing to discuss this issue further once it had found an equal
protection violation. The case is particularly appropriate since
both the completion statute45 and the constitutional section"
parallel the statute and constitutional section at issue in
Kallas.
Saylor involved an action for the wrongful death of plain-
tiff's son and for personal injuries of a second son caused by
the collapse of a stone fireplace constructed by the defendant.
Although the evidence showed that defendant had installed
the fireplace braces in a negligent manner, the trial court
found that the action was barred by the Kentucky completion
statute. On appeal, plaintiffs alleged that the legislature had
no power to extinguish common-law rights based on negli-
gence actions. The Kentucky court, citing Silver v. Silver,7
which dealt with the constitutionality of auto guest statutes,
noted that the Supreme Court had held that Congress had the
power to abolish old rights recognized at common law. By
analogy, the court noted it was within the province of the leg-
islature to validate workmen's compensation laws and auto-
mobile guest-passenger statutes, both of which abrogated cer-
tain common-law rights. However, the state constitution had
44. 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973).
45. Ky. REv. STAT. § 413.135 (1969).
46. Ky. CONST., § 14, which provides: "All courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by
due course of law, and right in justice administered without sale, denial, or delay."
47. 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
19791
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
long been construed as prohibiting the legislative branch from
abolishing common-law negligence. Further, Kentucky was a
state that had invalidated a guest-passenger statute 8 because
of a conflict with the state constitution. Accordingly, the court
hesitantly stated that "these statutes cannot be applied to bar
the claims that are the subjects of this action. Our holding,
however, is confined to that specific decision."'" The court, in
limiting its decision, was able to avoid broad constitutional
questions. Further, it stated it did not care to confront the de-
bate concerning substantive due process versus procedural due
process, which a broad analysis of the legislative role in enact-
ing a completion statute that abrogates common-law rights
would certainly entail. While recognizing the legislature's
power to enact statutes of limitation, the court stated it was
equally well settled that the legislature could not abolish ex-
isting common-law actions based on negligence. Thus, it con-
cluded that the statute could not be applied to bar plaintiff's
claim in this case.
The court in Saylor did not, however, completely invali-
date the state's completion statute. It would seem that the
Kentucky statute, as a procedural statute, (that is, one which
merely limits the time for bringing an action when plaintiffs
are aware of their injury) would be a valid limitations statute.
However, when the statute affects substantive rights by bar-
ring any claim at all, it would seem to be constitutionally de-
fective. A completion statute has such a substantive effect
when the cause of action does not accrue until after the period
defined in the statute has passed.
While Kallas suggested, at least indirectly by citing Diana
Shooting Club, that article I, section 9 guaranteed remedies as
to unlawful trespass, other common-law actions such as negli-
gence might similarly be protected at least to the extent of
constitutional safeguards from legislation couched in procedu-
ral terms which have substantive effects as to rights of action.
However, several other jurisdictions faced with similar issues
have found no state constitutional violations 0 Judging from
48. Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932).
49. 497 S.W.2d at 220.
50. See, e.g., Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647 (1976) (holding
that the legislature did not interfere with a vested right but simply cut off the right to
[Vol. 63:87
DEFECTIVE DESIGN
the hesitancy of the Wisconsin court to rest on these grounds,
the narrow finding of the Kentucky court and the refusal to
invalidate at all by other jurisdictions, it seems unlikely that
the remedy for a wrong approach will have any far reaching
implications. At best, its usefulness would appear to be lim-
ited to specific factual findings on a case-by-case basis."
C. The Amended Completion Statute
Subsequent to the invalidation of the state's first comple-
tion statute, section 893.155 was amended to read as follows:
No action to recover damages for any injury to property,
or for an injury to the person, arising out of the defective and
unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, nor
any action for contribution or indemnity for damages sus-
tained on account of such injury, shall be brought against
any person performing or furnishing the design, land survey-
ing, planning, supervision of construction, materials or con-
struction of such improvement to real property, more than 6
years after the substantial completion of construction. If the
injury or defect occurs or is discovered more than 5 years but
less than 6 years after the substantial completion of con-
struction, the time for bringing the action shall be extended
6 months.2
The statute as amended effectuated a number of changes.
First "land surveying" and "materials"sO were added to the
list of services which might be performed as an improvement
sue); Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977) (court
found an equal protection violation but could find no support for the contention that
the statute denied a remedy for a wrong). But see Ciancio v. Serafini, 574 P.2d 876
(Colo. App. 1977) (holding that a statute in derogation of a common-law right of ac-
tion must be strictly construed).
51. The court in Rosenthal also hinted that the Wisconsin completion statute
"overstepped the bounds of due process in varying degrees." 62 Wis. 2d at 11, 213
N.W.2d at 746. Although the court did not discuss a due process violation in any
detail, it suggested that the violation was in the way the statute specifically protected
architects and builders. Finally, the court stated that it could be compelled to invali-
date the statute in a subsequent case since its denial of "property, i.e., a cause of
action recognized by law, could well run afoul of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution." Id. at 12, 213 N.W.2d at 746.
52. Wis. STAT. § 893.155 (1977). See also Limitation of Action Statutes for Archi-
tects and Builders, supra note 1, at 361, where it is suggested that changes to cure the
defective statute were made.
53. See Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454
(1974) (court found equal protection denied because materialmen were excluded).
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to property." Second, the amended statute substituted the
words "substantial completion" and deleted the words "per-
formance or furnishing of such services." Third, the new stat-
ute omitted the sentence which previously made the statute
inapplicable to owners or persons in control.5 Last, a provision
was added allowing an extension of six months if the injury
occurred more than five but less than six years after
completion."'
The major question is whether these amendments correct
the defects which caused the first completion statute to be de-
clared unconstitutional. The primary basis of invalidation was
a denial of equal protection to certain classes of defendants
under the statute. On the face of the new statute, material-
men and land surveyors have been added to the list of those
protected. At first glance, it may appear that owners and
those in control of property, now no longer explicitly excluded
on the face of the statute, may also come under the protective
umbrella. This is not the case, however. First, the statute
states that no action will be brought "arising out of the defec-
tive and unsafe condition of an improvement to real prop-
erty" 7 as to those who "perform or furnish"58 such improve-
ments. Nor may an action for contribution or indemnity be
brought against these same persons. Clearly, owners or those
in control of property are not included, unless perhaps they
also performed one of the functions listed, in which case there
might be a question as to whether the statute would be appli-
cable. Second, the statement of legislative intent published
along with the statute in chapter 335 specifically states that
"[tihis act shall not deprive any person of any rights or reme-
54. While furnishing materials is now included, it would seem manufacturers
would not be included. See text following note 104 infra.
55. 1975 Wis. Laws ch. 335. Deleted words are: "This limitation shall not apply to
any person in actual possession and control as owner, tenant or otherwise, of the im-
provement at the time the defective and unsafe condition of such improvement con-
stitutes the proximate cause of the injury for which it is proposed to bring an action."
56. The grace period cures the defect illustrated in Cohen, where the plaintiffs
brought suit just five months before the statute barred the action as to the architects.
Defendants failed to act soon enough to bring in the architects and were thus barred
by the completion statute. Supposedly, the defendants would have had an additional
six months under the amended statute to act.




dies such persons may have against persons other than those
enumerated in this act . . . -51 The statute, therefore, still
protects a class of defendants. The amendments do not cure
the defect discussed in Kallas as to a denial of equal protec-
tion. In fact, it made no change at all in this regard.
It may be that the legislature was well aware of the fact
that the amendments did little to change the statute because
of the extensive findings and statement of intent that were
published as a preface to the statute." However, it is an ele-
mentary rule of statutory construction that if a statute is un-
constitutional on its face, the fact that a legislature's purpose
and motive are legitimate will not save the statute.'
In summary, the new completion statute is really the old
completion statute. The equal protection defect remains. It
may reasonably be assumed, then, that if the supreme court is
confronted with a statute of limitations defense based on the
amended section it would again declare the statute void.
III. INTERIM CASES
After Wisconsin's first completion statute was declared un-
constitutional, but before the legislature enacted a second
59. Id. at § 2(b).
60. The Wisconsin Legislature made the following statement of intent:
(1) Findings. The legislature finds that:
(a) Subsequent to the completion of construction persons involved in the
planning, design and construction of improvements to real estate lack control
over the determination of the need for, the undertaking of and the responsibil-
ity for maintenance, and lack control over other forces, uses and intervening
causes which cause stress, strain, wear and tear to the improvements and in
most cases have no right or opportunity to be made aware of or to evaluate the
effect of these forces on a particular improvement or to take action to overcome
the effect of these forces.
(b) It is in the public interest to set a point in time following the substan-
tial completion of the project after which no action may be brought for errors
and omissions in the planning, design and construction of improvements to real
estate, whether these errors and omissions have resulted or may result in injury
or not. This legislation is determined to be in the public interest and in the
interest of equating the rights to due process between prospective litigants in
the area of planning, design and construction of improvements to real property
in an equitable manner.
1975 Wis. Laws ch. 335.
61. 1 C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIoN § 2.06 (4th ed. 1972). "If a
statute is incapable of any valid application or if its very existence has an intimidat-
ing effect tending to inhibit the exercise and enjoyment of constitutionally protected
freedoms, it is held to be invalid on its face and wholly void." Id. (footnote omitted).
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completion statute, a number of cases raised the issue of the
proper statute of limitations for actions against parties who
had designed or furnished improvements to property. These
"interim" cases are important for two reasons. First, they re-
main precedent for claims brought prior to 1976.2 Second, and
more importantly, if the new statute is still constitutionally
defective, these interim cases will be precedent for all such
claims.
In Abramowski, the plaintiffs argued that since section
893.155, Wisconsin's first completion statute, had been found
unconstitutional, there was no limitation period for such
claims. The defendant countered that under either section
893.13(3) or 893.19(5) the statute of limitatiofis had run. The
court, after finding section 893.19(3) inapplicable because of
the absence of a contract claim, held that since section
893.19(5) had applied to actions involving improvements to
real property before the enactment of Wisconsin's first com-
pletion statute," it would again be applicable.
Like the invalidated completion statute, section 893.19(5)
has a limitation period of six years. The significant difference
is that under a completion statute, the time begins to run
from the completion of the improvement, whereas under sec-
tion 893.19(5), the time for bringing a claim runs from the
time a cause of action accrues under section 893.14.64 The Wis-
consin Supreme Court has held that "[a] cause of action ac-
crues where there exists a claim capable of present enforce-
ment, a suable party against whom it may be enforced, and a
party who has a present right to enforce it."' '65 The court in
Abramowski accepted plaintiff's contention that no cause of
action could accrue until an injury had occurred. In support of
this, the court relied on another interim case, Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. Osborn Plumbing.66
62. Kallas found section 893.155 unconstitutional in 1974. The statute was
amended by 1975 Wis. Laws ch. 335. The effective date was June 13, 1976. See also
Shaurette v. Capitol Erecting Co., 23 Wis. 2d 538, 128 N.W.2d 34 (1964) (holding that
the first completion statute did not operate retroactively).
63. Abramowski v. Win. Kilps Sons Realty, Inc., 80 Wis. 2d 468, 239 N.W.2d 306
(1977). See also Shaurette v. Capitol Erecting Co., 23 Wis. 2d 538, 128 N.W.2d 34
(1964).
64. Wis. STAT. § 893.14 (1977).
65. Holifield v. Setco Indus., Inc., 42 Wis. 2d 750, 168 N.W.2d 177 (1968).
66. 66 Wis. 2d 454, 225 N.W.2d 628 (1975).
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Hartford involved an action for an injury to property by a
fire caused by a negligently installed water heater. The insur-
ance company brought a subrogation suit against the architect
that had approved the plan. The architect moved for sum-
mary judgment setting forth an affirmative defense based on
the statute of limitations, section 893.19(5); the trial court
granted the motion, reasoning that the injury occured when
the heater was installed. 7 On appeal, the supreme court
stated that the installation of a heater could not be viewed as
an injury, rather, "[b]oth the act of negligence and the fact of
resultant injury must take place before a cause of action
founded on negligence can be said to have accrued."68
Two recent appellate court cases have further defined when
there is an injury sufficient for the bringing of an action. In
the first of these, Tallmadge v. Skyline Construction, Inc.,"
plaintiffs, second owners of a twenty-four unit apartment
building, brought suit alleging negligent planning and con-
struction. The trial court granted defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment since it found that the action had not been
commenced until more than six years after the action had ac-
crued. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the supreme court
had never decided the magnitude of injury necessary for the
bringing of an action. The court, after noting that injury and
negligent act do not necessarily coincide, suggested that
"when the evidence of injury to property . . . is sufficiently
significant to alert the injured party to the possibility of a de-
fect,"70 a sufficient injury has been sustained to start the run-
ning of the limitations period. The test appears to involve a
factual determination as to whether an injury was "sufficiently
significant" to put an injured party on notice. The court ad-
ded that "[t]he injury need not . . . be of such magnitude as
to identify the causal factor."' This is a curious statement; if
67. The rule that an injury occurs at the time of the negligent act is applied in
legal and medical malpractice cases. See Boehm v. Wheeler, 65 Wis. 2d 668, 223
N.W.2d 536 (1974); Olson v. St. Croix Valley Memorial Hosp., 55 Wis. 2d 628, 201
N.W.2d 63 (1972).
68. 66 Wis. 2d at 462, 225 N.W.2d at 632. See also Rosenthal v. Kurtz, 62 Wis. 2d
1, 213 N.W.2d 741 (1974), wherein the court stated that a cause of action accrues
when an injury occurs.
69. 86 Wis. 2d 356, 272 N.W.2d 404 (Ct. App. 1978).




a party is unaware of the cause of his injury how can that
party determine against whom the claim should be brought?
The very definition of an accrual of a cause of action requires
that there be "a suable party against whom [the claim] may
be enforced. ' 72 Therefore, it would seem that the party should
at least be able to ascertain the cause of his injury.
The second case, Crawford v. Shepherd,73 involved an ac-
tion by a plaintiff-owner of an apartment complex against de-
fendants-architects, who had designed the unit. The complex
was designed in March of 1968; the roof began to rot and leak
in 1974. The architects moved for summary judgment alleging
the statute of limitations barred plaintiff's claim. The trial
court denied the motion and the appellate court affirmed,
stating that "in architectural negligence cases, the statute of
limitations begins to run when the injury, not the negligence
occurs. '7 Further, the court stated that the running of the
statute depends on the evidence of the injury. Talimadge, like
Crawford, suggests that the occurence of an injury is a ques-
tion of fact. In cases such as these, then, it would appear that
summary judgment motions based on a statute of limitations
defense will not often be granted since there will be, in most
instances, a factual question as to whether a plaintiff was suf-
ficiently on notice of the injury.
IV. THE CALIFORNIA APPROACH
In Kallas, the court stated that in order to withstand equal
protection scrutiny it must be established that substantial dis-
tinctions exist which make the protected class truly different
from that which is not so protected. 75 The question becomes
one of looking for the distinction that will tip the scale in favor
of protecting a class. The most important factor seems to be
that of time; the existence of a substantial distinction is thus
a function of the time interval. The arguments in favor of bar-
ring suit against those performing services to improve property
become more substantial the longer it has been since those
services were completed. On the other hand, if a relatively
72. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
73. 86 Wis. 2d 362, 272 N.W.2d 401 (Ct. App. 1978).
74. Id. at 368, 272 N.W.2d at 403.
75. 66 Wis. 2d at 388-89, 225 N.W.2d at 458.
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short time has passed the reasons opposing a statute barring
claims against a favored class are considerable when a defen-
dant-owner is subject to liability without having an opportu-
nity to get indemnification from the party primarily responsi-
ble for the injury.
The time factor is important because of the existence of
latent defects. Without latent defects, a simple procedural
limitations statute could be devised defining the time within
which a plaintiff must bring an action once the injury has be-
come apparent. But because of latency, the completion stat-
ute, at times, creates a pseudo-limitations" statute which ex-
tinguishes substantive rights. As has been mentioned however,
a number of policy considerations demand that builders and
architects receive special protection. The problem, then, is one
of devising a statute which provides for the special problems
of builders and architects and yet treats all defendants fairly.
As had been suggested above, in order for a completion-
type statute to be constitutionally antiseptic it must take into
consideration both the time factor and the distinction between
patent and latent defects. Several states have in fact adopted
this approach. California, for example, has two distinct stat-
utes delineating periods of limitation on the basis of whether a
defect is patent or latent.
As to patent defects, no action can be brought in California
against "any person performing or furnishing the design, spec-
ifications, surveying, planning, supervision or observation of
construction or construction of an improvement to real prop-
erty more than four years after the substantial completion of
such improvement . . . . " Expressly excluded from the stat-
76. See the dissent in Howell, 90 N.M. at __, 568 P.2d at 226, wherein the dissent-
ing justice stated the completion statute "is not a statute of limitations. It is 'an
unlawful attempt to extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever might be the purport of its
provisions."' The dissent agreed with the finding in Kallas as to finding an equal
protection violation. Id. at -, 568 P.2d at 230.
77. The full text reads as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no action shall be brought to
recover damages from any person performing or furnishing the design, specifi-
cations, surveying, planning, supervision or observation of construction or con-
struction of an improvement to real property more than four years after the
substantial completion of such improvement for any of the following:
(1) Any patent deficiency in the design, specifications, surveying, planning,
supervision or observation of construction or construction of an improvement
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ute's operation are owner-occupied, single-family dwellings"
and persons in possession or control of the property. As to la-
tent defects, the California statute provides that no action can
be brought against "any person who develops real property or
performs or furnishes the design, specifications, surveying,
planning, supervision, testing, or observation of construction
or construction of an improvement to real property more than
ten years after the substantial completion of such develop-
ment or improvement . . . ."I Persons in possession or con-
to, or survey of, real property;
(2) Injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such patent defi-
ciency; or
(3) Injury to the person or for wrongful death arising out of any such patent
deficiency.
(b) If, by reason of such patent deficiency, an injury to property or the person
or an injury causing wrongful death occurs during the fourth year after such
substantial completion, an action in tort to recover damages for such an injury
or wrongful death may be brought within one year after the date of death, but
in no event may such an action be brought more than five years after the sub-
stantial completion of construction of such an improvement.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed as extending the period pre-
scribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any action.
(d) The limitation prescribed by this section shall not be asserted by way of
defense by any person in actual possession or the control, as owner, tenant or
otherwise, of such an improvement at the time any deficiency in such an im-
provement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or death for which it is
proposed to bring an action.
(e) As used in this section, "patent deficiency" means a deficiency which is
apparent by reasonable inspection.
(f) Subdivisions (a) and (b) shall not apply to any owner-occupied single-unit
residence.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 337.1 (West Supp. 1978).
78. Id. The Wisconsin Legislature might consider such an exclusion in light of the
statutory warranty provided by Wis. Stat. § 706.10(a) (1977), and by Home Owners
Warranty Insurance coverage. See Comment, Builder-Vendor Liability for Construc-
tion Defects in Houses, 55 MARQ. L. REv. 369 (1972).
79. California's latent defect statute provides:
(a) No action may be brought to recover damages from any person who devel-
ops real property or performs or furnishes the design, specifications, surveying,
planning, supervision, testing, or observation of construction or construction of
an improvement to real property more than 10 years after the substantial com-
pletion of such development or improvement for any of the following:
(1) Any latent deficiency in the design, specification, surveying, plan-
ning, supervision, or observation of construction or construction of an improve-
ment to, or survey of, real property.
(2) Injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such latent
deficiency.
(b) As used in this section, "latent deficiency" means a deficiency which is
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trol of an improvement are expressly excluded from the opera-
tion of the statute. In effect, the statute provides that no
latent defect can exist with respect to construction after the
passage of ten years." Thus, after ten years it becomes the sole
duty of an owner to inspect and make safe the premises and to
bear any losses from injuries to third parties."
Although California has a four- and ten-year limitation pe-
riod as to patent and latent defects, respectively, other states
with such statutes have used shorter limitations periods."
However, the Wisconsin legislature, if it should choose to
adopt a patent-latent statute, may do well to adopt a ten-year
statute for latent defects. First, a shorter period, such as six
years, may prove vulnerable in view of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's invalidation of the state's first completion statute.
Second, the ten-year period is supported by a study which has
shown that 99.6% of all claims are brought within ten years
after completion of constructionss As to the time period for
not apparent by reasonable inspection.
(c) As used in this section, "action" includes an action for indemnity brought
against a person arising out of his performance or furnishing of services or
materials referred to in this section, except that a cross-complaint for indem-
nity may be filed pursuant to Section 442 in an action which has been brought
within the time period set forth in sub-division (a) of this section.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed as extending the period pre-
scribed by the laws of this state for bringing any action.
(e) The limitation prescribed by this section shall not be asserted by way of
defense by any person in actual possession or the control, as owner, tenant or
otherwise, of such an improvement, at the time any deficiency in such improve-
ment constitutes the proximate cause for which it is proposed to bring an
action.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.15 (West Supp. 1978).
80. After ten years, it might be just as likely that deficiencies are caused by lack
of upkeep and weathering. The evidentiary problem discussed earlier would thus take
on increased emphasis.
81. Contra, Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, -, 514 P.2d 568, 570 (1973) (finding the
Hawaii patent-latent statute providing a two-year or a ten-year period in contraven-
tion to equal protection guarantees although the specific defect related to the omis-
sion of materialmen).
82. HAWAn REv. STAT: § 657-8 (1976) (two-year and six-year periods); MASS. GN.
LAws ANN. ch. 260 § 2B (West 1978) (three-year and six-year periods); NEB. Rxv.
STAT. § 25-223 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (four-year and ten-year periods).
83. Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and Builders, supra note 1, at 367
(reporting Hearings on H.R. 6527, H.R. 6678 and H.R. 11544 Before Subcomm. No. 1
of the House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1977)).
The study, based on 570 random suits against architects, found that 37.1% of all
claims were brought within one year, 56.3% within two years, 73.1% within three
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patent defects, a period shorter than six years could be consid-
ered. Since plaintiffs now have only three years to bring suit in
negligence actions for personal injuries,"4 it would seem logical
that a longer period should not be provided for injuries to real
property. For these reasons, the Wisconsin legislature should
consider adopting a patent-latent statute of limitations for in-
jury to real property with a three- to ten-year limitations pe-
riod that runs from the time an improvement is completed.
The Massachusetts patent-latent statutes provides for
bringing claims within three years from the time a cause of
action accrues, but in no event can an action be brought more
than six years after completion. The advantage of this statute
is that the period of limitation for bringing claims is uniformly
defined. The California model, on the other hand, allows a
ten-year limitation period for latent defects regardless of
whether the defect was apparent four or nine years after com-
pletion. However, in support of the California approach, latent
defects are often injuries which appear gradually, and, as the
Crawford" and Tallmadge7 cases illustrate, courts may have
difficulty in determining whether a party had notice of his in-
jury in latent defect cases. For this reason, the California
model appears to be easier to apply.
V. PRODUCT LiABIrrY CONFUSION
Another consideration as to whether a completion statute,
if one could be validly constructed, should be created is the
broad application these statutes have been given in the past
- often well beyond the scope the legislature may have in-
years, 84.3% within four years, 89.7% within five years, 93% within six years, 97.9%
within seven years, 98.7% within eight years, 99.2% within nine years and 99.6%
within ten years.
While 93% of claims had been made within six years (the present limitations pe-
riod defined by section 893.155) 6.6% or 38 claims were made after the six-year period.
As illustrated by Crawford and Tallmadge, notice of a latent defect is difficult to
pinpoint. Since claims were made continually for ten years, the argument can be
made that the claims resulted from latent injuries. No claims were brought eleven
and twelve years after completion. One claim was brought in each of the thirteenth
and fourteenth years. Id.
84. Wis. STAT. § 893.205 (1977).
85. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 260 § 2B (West 1973).
86. Crawford v. Shepherd, 86 Wis. 2d 362, 272 N.W.2d 401 (Ct. App. 1978).




tended. Some applications have been in cases involving roof
collapse, s negligent installation of insulation, 9 negligent con-
struction of a fire place,90 negligent design of ventilation," de-
fective garage door operation,9" inaccurate survey 3 and base-
ment collapse. 4 All of these cases would appear to be the type
of improvement to property the completion statute was
designed to cover. But the completion statute has also been
applied in the following cases: defective fastening of overhead
monorail track in factory,95 negligent construction of high pres-
sure water system,98 a defective elevator97 and a defective con-
veyor system. 8 Arguably, these latter cases are demonstrative
of product liability claims and thus should not have been gov-
erned by completion statutes. Since an item can become af-
fixed to real property, manufacturers may have a convenient
bar to claims depending on whether the defectively manufac-
tured product is deemed to be a fixture.
Two Virginia federal district court cases provide an excel-
lent example of problems in this area. In Wiggins v., Proctor &
Schwartz, Inc.,9 which involved an action against a manufac-
turer of a machire, the defendant asserted that plaintiff's
claim was barred because of the Virginia completion statute.10
After first determining that the machine was a fixture, the
court stated that the statute should be given a reasonably lib-
eral interpretation and that the words "construct" and "man-
88. Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973); Josephs v. Burns, 260 Or.
493, 491 P.2d 203 (1971).
89. Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 234 Pa. Super. 441, 341 A.2d 184
(1975), aff'd, 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978).
90. Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d (Ky. 1973).
91. Skinner v. Anderson, 38 fIl. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).
92. Broome v. Trulucki, 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978).
93. Ciancio v. Serafini, 574 P.2d 867 (Colo. App. 1977).
94. Abramowski v. Win. Kilps Sons Realty, Inc., 80 Wis. 2d 468, 259 N.W.2d 306
(1977).
95. Schaurette v. Capitol Erecting Co., 23 Wis. 2d 538, 128 N.W.2d 34 (1964).
96. Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454'
(1974).
97. Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal dismissed,
401 U.S. 901 (1971).
98. Plant v. R.L. Reid, Inc., 294 Ala. 155, 313 So. 2d 518 (1975).
99. 330 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Va. 1971).
100. VA. CODE § 8-24.2 (1950). The Virginia completion statute is similar to sec-
tion 893.155 before it was amended in 1975.
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ufacture" are synonymous.' 0 ' Therefore, the statute applied to
bar plaintiff's claim.
In Smith v. Alien-Bradley Co.,' 0 the plaintiff, in the course
of his employment, had both of his hands crushed because of
an allegedly faulty limit switch on a press. The defendant-
manufacturer set forth an affirmative defense based on the
Virginia completion statute. Noting that the completion stat-
ute was enacted "at the behest of architects, designers, engi-
neers and building contractors,' '0 3 the plaintiff argued that
the statute "was never meant to apply to manufacturers of
chattels which become improvements to realty."'0 4 The court,
however, found itself constrained to follow the precedent set
out in Wiggins, and thus held that the plaintiff's suit was
barred.
Fortunately, the problem encountered by the plaintiff in
Smith has not arisen directly in Wisconsin. It might be
pointed out, however, that the court may have flirted with this
problem in Kallas, where it was found that a high pressure
water system was an improvement to property as a matter of
law. It is hoped, that if the legislature does create a special
statute of limitations for products liability cases, that it would
do so in light of the problems unique to those types of claims.
The completion statute clearly should not be applicable to
products liability claims. Finally, if the legislature decides to
adopt a patent-latent statute, it should be made clear that
construct is not synonymous with manufacture.
VI. CONCLUSION
The question of the enactment of a special completion
statute to protect those who furnish the design or improve-
ment to real property should be considered in light of past
controversies. The inequality of treatment among classes of
defendants has at times proven to be inequitable. Not surpris-
ingly, Wisconsin's first completion statute was found violative
of equal protection guarantees. Since section 893.155, as
amended, has the same constitutional defects as its predeces-
101. 330 F. Supp. at 353.
102. 371 F. Supp. 698 (W.D. Va. 1974).
103. Id. at 699.
104. Id. at 700.
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sor, it can be expected that a court faced with the statute as a
defense will again declare it unconstitutional. If so, the in-
terim cases will continue to be precedent and the appropriate
period of limitations for claims arising out of injury to prop-
erty would be defined by section 893.19(5), which provides a
six-year period from the time a cause of action has accrued.05
As has been demonstrated, however, difficulties - most
notably the "long-tail" and notice of injury problems - exist
in the absence of a completion statute. It is suggested, then,
that the Wisconsin legislature reexamine the policy considera-
tions both for and against a completion statute. Applying a
balancing test, the scale appears to tip to one side or the other
depending on the number of years that have passed since com-
pletion of the improvement. For this reason, a patent-latent
statute such as the California model should be considered.
Such a statute, while giving due regard to the special needs of
builders and architects, would also treat most defendants, as
well as plaintiffs, in a fair and equitable manner.
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105. The most recent interim case is Hunter v. School Dist. of Gale-Ettrick-Trem-
pealeau, 90 Wis. 2d 523, 280 N.W.2d 313 (Ct. App. 1979). The court refused to apply
the amended completion statute since the action accrued before reenactment. The
court held that an existing cause of action is a vested right protected by the due
process clause.
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